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(When) Does Austerity Work? On the Conditional Link between 
Fiscal Austerity and Debt Sustainability  
Vassilis Monastiriotis   
European Institute, London School of Economics 
 
Abstract 
The Eurozone crisis has given a new impetus to academic and policy debates 
about the merits and ills of fiscal consolidation policies (austerity). Fuelled by the 
huge contraction experienced by some ‘bailout countries’, and especially Greece, a 
new consensus seems to have emerged, that “austerity doesn’t work”. Yet, many 
Eurozone countries have seen a relatively fruitful implementation of fiscal 
consolidation programmes, with fiscal pressures being successfully curtailed and 
the adverse growth effects of austerity being very short-lived. The literature has 
only recently shifted its attention to the qualitative characteristics of fiscal 
consolidation to explain variations in economic performance (growth) across 
countries in the course of austerity. Still, attention to political-institutional and 
structural-economic factors is generally lacking. This paper makes a contribution 
in this direction, by showing that two domestic-context parameters – trade 
openness and quality of government – exert significant influence on the impact 
that austerity has on growth and debt-sustainability. Factoring-in these 
parameters allows us to contextualise a number of ‘stylised facts’ of the Eurozone 
crisis, including the huge recession and large snowball effect for Greece, the 
relatively painless fiscal consolidation in parts of the Eurozone north, and the 
surprising decline in nominal interest rates seen is some of the most agile 
Eurozone countries. 
 
Keywords: austerity, growth, debt sustainability, quality of government.  
1. Introduction 
The Eurozone crisis has given a new impetus to academic and policy 
debates about the merits and ills of fiscal expansion and contraction. 
Fuelled by the huge contraction experienced in Greece and, less so, in other 
‘bailout’ countries, and later by the awkward admittance by the IMF that 
their initial projections about the fiscal multiplier and thus of the effects of 
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austerity were way off the mark (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013a), numerous 
contributions emerged arguing the case that “austerity doesn’t work”. 
Although not representing, even remotely, a fundamental shift of 
mainstream economic thinking on the topic, the “austerity trap” idea has 
undoubtedly gained currency well beyond its traditional Keynesian and 
heterodox-economics ‘home’. The essence of this renewed austerity debate 
has its roots in two rather simple premises. One the one hand, that primary 
surpluses (and, in this sense, fiscal consolidation1) are necessary for a 
reduction in debt (at least in terms of levels). On the other hand, that fiscal 
consolidation deprives the economy of some of its key growth drivers 
(fiscal stimulation, in the case of reductions in government spending; 
and/or private consumption, in the case of increases in taxation), thus 
putting further pressures on public debt (at least in share-of-GDP terms). 
It is thus no accident that the size of the ‘fiscal multiplier’ has become a 
central feature in this debate. A multiplier of less than unity implies a less-
than-proportionate loss of GDP with fiscal consolidation and thus justifies 
austerity policies despite their obvious social and economic costs; 
inversely, an above-unity multiplier suggests directly that austerity is ‘self-
defeating’, as the fiscal effort reduces GDP by more than the savings 
achieved in terms of debt (the so-called “snowball effect”). Analytically, 
the size of the multiplier depends on specific assumptions about how 
economic agents respond to (changes in) government spending and 
taxation and how fast prices and wages adjust to changing demand and 
supply conditions in the economy. In a Keynesian world, with significant 
price and wage stickiness and adaptive expectations, fiscal multipliers are 
large and typically well above unity. In turn, in a neoclassical world, 
where prices adjust instantaneously and economic agents are rational and 
fully-informed, changes in government spending are immediately 
discounted in the economy and thus multipliers tend to be closer to zero2.   
Despite the centrality of this issue, even prior to the crisis, the empirical 
evidence on the size of the multiplier is largely considered to be 
inconclusive, as estimates across studies range from well below 1 to above 
3 (Chinn, 2013). Recent contributions in the literature have sought to 
explain this variation (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013) and a number 
of factors that influence the size of the multiplier have been proposed 
theoretically or identified empirically – from a country’s position in the 
                                                 
1 By fiscal consolidation we mean the curtailment of excessive budget deficits and 
government debts to sustainable levels. A primary surplus is a positive balance in the 
government primary account, i.e., its budget position excluding expenditures for interest 
paid on its debt. 
2 See Chinn (2013) for an accessible exposition and discussion. 
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business cycle and the overall level of its public debt to the role of market 
confidence and the macro-monetary policy environment (see, inter alia, 
Christiano et al, 2011; Corsetti et al, 2012a; Bachmann and Sims, 2012; 
Ilzetzki et al, 2013). However, the literature stops short of offering an 
explicit treatment of the fiscal multiplier as an endogenous aggregate3.  As 
a result, much of the policy debate and analysis on the issue of austerity 
and the austerity–growth relationship continues to treat the multiplier as 
strictly exogenous.  
This paper aims at contributing in the direction of the development of a 
more explicit debate about the endogeneity of the fiscal multiplier and of 
the factors influencing debt dynamics more generally, including the level 
of interest faced by indebted governments. Its aim is to add to the existing 
literature by moving beyond the macro-monetary (‘systemic’) factors that 
have been the subject of recent relevant studies and considering instead the 
role of idiosyncratic (country-specific) factors, which can account for the 
conditions under which austerity may be self-defeating or recovery-
promoting even within the same macro-monetary context. Our attention is 
with two sets of factors. On the one hand, factors related to economic 
structure: we look at trade openness as an overarching indicator of this. On 
the other hand, factors related to government and institutional quality 
aspects such as budgetary effectiveness, state/administrative capacity, 
consensus/coalition-building capabilities and government credibility – 
summarised under the broad heading of ‘quality of government’ (see 
Rothstein, 2011, and especially Rothstein and Teorell, 2012).  
We begin with a review of the recent literature on debt dynamics and fiscal 
multipliers, highlighting the main findings and the main points of 
contention (section 2). In section 3 we turn to the empirical evidence and 
revisit the ‘empirical regularity’ concerning the negative relationship 
between austerity and growth. The evidence we present goes against 
simple arguments holding that austerity is invariably and universally 
recessionary. Instead, we show a rather sizeable heterogeneity among EU 
countries in the intensity (and direction) of the growth–austerity 
relationship. Following, in section 4 we consider two main factors 
accounting for this heterogeneity (trade openness and quality of 
government) and go on to show that these factors play an important role 
for the identified ‘empirical regularity’ of recessionary austerity. The paper 
concludes with some implications for policy and for the wider debate 
about the relationship between fiscal consolidation and debt sustainability.  
                                                 
3 See Roeger and in’t Veld (2009), Pal Szekely et al (2011), and Eyraud and Weber (2013) for 
partial exceptions to this. 
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2. Debt sustainability, growth and austerity 
Prior to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the debate on debt dynamics 
and fiscal consolidation was framed largely around two theoretical schools 
of thought. On the one hand, the Keynesian tradition which saw fiscal 
expansion as growth-inducing, owing to the premise of price- and wage-
stickiness. Drawing on the well-known ‘fiscal multiplier’, the prediction 
was essentially that ‘borrowing for the future’ works, as it allows 
governments to mobilise resources – through fiscal expansion, including 
for consumption – thus pushing the economy closer to full employment 
statically and to a higher growth equilibrium in a dynamic sense. On the 
other hand, the monetarist and neo-classical tradition predicted that fiscal 
activism is largely ineffective, as – perfectly informed – individuals 
anticipate future tax hikes in response to any present fiscal expansion and 
thus adjust their investment and consumption decisions downwards in a 
way that cancels the stimulus to the economy instigated by government 
spending (the so-called Ricardian Equivalence).  
Almost concurrently with the eruption of the crisis, the controversial work 
of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2010) came to offer a synthesis between 
the two views, claiming that a historical limit to fiscal expansion exists, 
estimated at around 90% of GDP. This work seemed to justify the 
mainstream concern with fiscal discipline and consolidation, especially for 
highly indebted countries such as Greece – and the USA – but it was soon 
discredited owing to revelations about data manipulation and blunt errors 
of analysis (Herndon et al, 2014; Dube, 2013; Kimball and Wang, 2013). 
Building on this, a number of papers sought to re-examine the presumed 
hump-shaped relationship between national debt and GDP growth. In 
their study of twelve Eurozone countries covering the period since the 
1970s, Checherita and Rother (2010) find that GDP growth is non-linearly 
related to the debt-to-GDP ratio, with the point of inflection  at around 90-
100% of GDP (and perhaps even lower), thus providing evidence 
consistent with the Reinhart-Rogoff argument. Baum et al (2012) provide 
further evidence for this, while the study by Egert (2012) brings the 
threshold point much lower, to between 20-60% of GDP. Against this 
background, Panizza and Presbitero (2012 and 2013) provide both primary 
and meta-evidence showing that the finding of a negative (linear) or a 
hump-shaped debt–growth relationship is not particularly robust or 
indeed stable across samples and periods, suggesting also the possibility of 
temporal shifts in this relationship.  
Evidence of a temporal shift in the growth–debt relationship has in fact 
been provided in the study of Baum et al (2012), who find that the 
threshold level beyond which debt may be hindering growth increased 
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substantially during the crisis. This finding is consistent with results in a 
broader literature concerning the size of the fiscal multiplier and its 
variation across periods of expansion and slack. This growing literature 
provides strong empirical evidence that the size of the fiscal multiplier 
declines (tends to zero) in periods of economic expansion but rises 
substantially in recessions, with estimates for the multiplier ranging 
between 1.5 and 3.5 (see Christiano et al, 2011; Cotarelli and Jaramillo, 
2012; and especially Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010 and 2013 and 
references within) – thus going well above the ‘average’ estimates of 
between 0.5 and 1.5 found in the traditional literature (see Chinn, 2013). 
Some studies in the literature link this counter-cyclical behaviour of the 
fiscal multiplier to monetary policy aggregates. For example, Christiano et 
al (2011) show that the multiplier is larger when the policy space for 
monetary accommodation is limited (near-zero interest rates), which is 
typically in times of negative growth; while Corsetti et al (2012a) find that 
fiscal expansion has negligible effects during normal times and with 
flexible exchange rates, but that the multiplier effect rises in times of crisis 
and in cases when exchange rates are fixed.  
In turn, other studies focus more on the role of ‘market confidence’ and 
consumer/investor behaviour. For example, Bachmann and Sims (2012) 
argue that consumer and business confidence influences positively the size 
of the multiplier but almost exclusively so in times of recession. Eggertsson 
and Krugman (2012) also find that in time of crisis the fiscal multiplier 
(and thus the contractionary effect of fiscal consolidation) is larger, owing 
to the fact that with higher credit constraints (illiquidity) consumption and 
investment decisions become more responsive to current, than future, 
incomes or demand. The issue of ‘confidence’ has also been raised by 
earlier studies in relation not to the business cycle but to the level of debt 
(Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina and Perotti, 1995). These studies find 
that in highly-indebted countries fiscal consolidation improves market 
expectations and stimulates investment, thus reducing the adverse 
multiplier effect. Recent evidence suggesting that fiscal multipliers are 
small in high-debt contexts has been provided by Ilzetzki et al (2013). 
This debate about the size and determinants of the fiscal multiplier 
obtained a new centrality when the IMF admitted that their estimates for 
the multiplier effect of fiscal consolidation were overly optimistic, if not 
unfounded, following the publication of the study by Blanchard and Leigh 
(2013a). The study provided compelling evidence showing that the fiscal 
multiplier increased sizably during the early part of the crisis while 
forecasts of the multiplier were increasingly inaccurate at the same period. 
The political salience of this admission was paramount, given the immense 
difficulties facing Greece at the time, as the country was experiencing an 
 76 
unprecedented economic contraction seemingly as a direct result of the 
pervasive austerity measures that it was forced to implement under its 
Macroeconomic Adjustment Programme(s). This then led to an explosion 
of academic and public literature making the case that austerity is “self-
defeating”, at least in the short-run, as it reduces the “denominator” (GDP) 
faster than the “numerator” (debt). Amongst them, the ‘early’ warning by 
Eurozone expert Daniel Gros (2011), the ‘insider’s’ account of the 
development of the Eurozone crisis by former ECB Executive Member 
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (Smaghi, 2013), highly influential op-eds by Nobel 
Laureate Paul Krugman (e.g., Krugman, 2012a, 2013a, 2013b), Mark Blyth’s 
meticulous historical treatment of the ‘idea’ of austerity (Blyth, 2013), the 
forward-thinking collection of short contributions in Corsetti (2012a), the 
more heterodox contributions in the 2012 special issue of the Cambridge 
Journal of Economics (King et al, 2012 – see especially Boyer, 2012), and a 
broad range of influential blog-posts (Frank, 2010; Best, 2011; Reich, 2012; 
Thomas and Jolly, 2012; Corsetti, 2012b; Alesina and Giavazzi, 2012; De 
Grauwe and Liu, 2012; Van Reenen, 2012, Collignon, 2013;  Attali, 2014) 
and more research-oriented pieces (Torres, 2012; Voth, 2012; Holland and 
Portes, 2012; Eyraud and Weber, 2013).  
Generally speaking, there are two strands of debate emerging from these 
contributions. On the one hand, a debate pointing to the ills of the 
‘austerity trap’ and arguing, even from within the mainstream (Krugman, 
2013b), for a policy shift towards an orchestrated fiscal stimulus. On the 
other hand, a debate in the more research-oriented literature, seeking to 
identify the specific conditions under which fiscal consolidation becomes 
particularly painful or ‘self-defeating’. The latter relates not only to the 
literature outlined above, concerning the role of monetary policy and the 
business cycle, but also to questions about the timing and composition of 
fiscal consolidation measures.4  Although both strands have a tractable 
grounding in economic theory, to a large extent they both draw their 
motivation from the empirics of the crisis and in particular their reading of 
the empirical relationship between austerity and growth. In the next 
section we take a closer look at the empirical validity of this relationship.  
 
 
                                                 
4 For example, Mineshima et al (2014) show that spending cuts are more recessionary than 
revenue-raising measures – although arguments to the contrary are also available in the 
literature. See also Alesina and Giavazzi (2012), Buti and Pench (2012), and Blanchard and 
Leigh (2013b) for public discussions of similar issues. 
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3. Revisiting the ‘empirical relationship’ between austerity and 
growth 
One of the most influential and ‘graphical’ illustrations of the “austerity 
doesn’t work” argument has been offered by Financial Times chief 
economics commentator Martin Wolf in one of his numerous public 
commentaries (Wolf, 2012). The commentary presented an unconditional 
correlation between forecasted GDP growth and the extent of structural 
fiscal tightening as percent of potential GDP (data taken from the April 
2013 edition of the IMF World Economic Outlook) for 15 Eurozone 
countries during the period 2008-2012. The correlation suggested that fiscal 
tightening by one percentage point of GDP corresponded to a decline in 
GDP per capita growth of 1.5 percentage points, thus offering strong 
support to the anti-austerity camp. A similar graph, on which Martin Wolf 
drew, was presented by Krugman (2012b), producing a multiplier estimate 
of 1.25% (for the EU countries). Despite the extensive publicity that the two 
commentaries achieved, overall there has been little scrutiny on the 
evidence presented and some important observations have largely gone 
unnoticed – relating in particular to the robustness of the relationship 
across alternative measures and the country heterogeneity around the 
obtained universal trend. 
To illustrate this, we report in Figure 1 four interesting variants of the 
analysis presented originally by Martin Wolf. Panel A reproduces Wolf’s 
analysis, replacing however the growth forecast for 2008-2012, used in the 
original graph, with the actual growth for the same period (data from 
Eurostat and measured in PPPs). Panel B does the same but this time 
excluding Greece, which is a clear outlier. Panel C reinstates Greece but 
replaces the IMF measure of fiscal tightening with a measure of the overall 
size of primary-deficit reduction5; while panel D replicates this but for the 
full population of Eurozone and euro-pegged countries. The results are 
particularly interesting. In panel A, the fitted regression line is in fact 
steeper than that originally produced by Martin Wolf, corresponding here 
to an elasticity of -2.2%. If interpreted in causal terms, this would seem to 
confirm the claim that austerity hinders growth. Despite this, the graphs in 
the other three panels of Figure 1 cast doubt on this conclusion. As is 
shown in panel B, the significance of the growth–austerity relationship 
vanishes when one single country – Greece, which is by far the main 
                                                 
5 This is measured by the distance between the 2012 primary deficit (which is for all 
countries the period minimum) and the largest primary deficit recorded in 2008-2011. The 
result obtained is identical when we use alternatively the change in the structural deficit (for 
2008-2012) as measured by the European Commission under the EDP procedure (Eurostat 
table gov_dd_edpt1). 
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outlier – is removed from the sample: the slope of the regression line drops 
to -0.6% and the corresponding R-squared becomes eight times smaller! It 
thus appears that, even on Martin Wolf’s evidence, Greece aside, austerity 
is not recessionary.  
More importantly, perhaps, panel C shows that the same conclusion is 
reached when looking not at the ex-ante fiscal tightening commitments, as 
in panel A, but at the actual change in the primary deficit (this time 
irrespective of whether Greece is included or not). In this case, the growth–
austerity elasticity drops to 0.1% and the fit of the regression drops by 
another 900%. Not only that, but the relationship vanishes completely 
when the relationship is tested not on the EZ sample but on the full 
population of EU countries with a euro-peg (panel D).6   
Irrespective of measure and sample, however, in all cases there are notable 
country differences in the growth–austerity relationship. For example, 
even in panel A, where the relationship is statistically significant, countries 
such as Greece, Spain and the Netherlands come out with a 
disproportionately high cost (in growth terms) in relation to fiscal 
tightening, while countries such as Ireland, Germany and Malta experience 
proportionately less contraction, relative to the average sample values, for 
every unit of fiscal tightening. The differences are much more pronounced 
when the austerity effort is measured in terms of actual changes in the 
primary deficit (bottom part of Figure 1). As can be seen there, many of the 
‘EZ north’ countries, which maintained a significant growth record, 
cumulatively, during the period, had deficit-reduction rates comparable to, 
or in excess of, those of Spain which had overall stagnant growth. At the 
extreme stand the three Baltic states, including the latest Eurozone-entrant 
Estonia, which saw very positive rates of growth concurrently to a 
substantial fiscal adjustment.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 This includes the Baltic countries plus Bulgaria. Panel D also includes Luxemburg, which 
was absent from Wolf’s sample. Note also that the result is identical when the sample is 
extended to include all EU countries, irrespective of exchange rate regime (not shown, but 
available upon request), as well as when the two main outliers – Greece and Ireland – are 
removed from the analysis. 
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FIGURE 1 
Revisiting the austerity – growth nexus  
Panel A: actual growth data in PPP                      Panel B: excluding Greece  
    Panel C: tightening as deficit reduction Panel D: EZ and €-peg countries 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data derived from Eurostat and Wolf (2012). 
 
These observations reinforce the point, made in the recent literature, that 
the growth cost of fiscal consolidation is not constant or purely exogenous 
– and that the effectiveness of fiscal adjustment may instead depend on 
contextual/environmental factors. As noted earlier, one strand of literature 
shows that such factors include the overall slack in the economy, the 
exchange rate regime, the state of public finances, the room for monetary 
expansion, and the severity of credit constraints. The performance of the 
‘EZ south’ countries, as depicted in Figure 1, is at least in part consistent 
with these predictions. Greece and Spain, for example, faced huge liquidity 
problems during the crisis in an environment of non-accommodating 
monetary policy, fixed exchange rates and general economic slack. Thus, 
for these countries the contractionary impact of austerity has been 
naturally larger. This, however, does not explain the difference between 
Greece and Spain or indeed why other countries, facing the same macro-
monetary conditions, have performed so differently – including high-debt 
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countries such as Belgium and Italy, small countries such as Malta and the 
Baltics, and high-deficit countries such as Ireland. It would appear that, 
besides the general environmental parameters, country-specific factors 
play an important role in the empirics of the austerity–growth relationship. 
4. Debt sustainability, openness and quality of government 
The analysis of the previous section has demonstrated the notable 
variation that exists across countries in Europe in terms of their experience 
of the austerity – growth relationship. As has been discussed previously, 
the negative sign of this relationship is central in the idea of the ‘austerity 
trap’: the more negative this relationship is, the larger the ‘snowball effect’ 
and thus the less likely that austerity will lead to a decline in the debt-to-
GDP ratio (and thus to debt sustainability). The observed country variation 
suggests in turn that the intensity of this relationship is, at least to an 
extent, influenced by country-specific factors. In what follows we focus on 
two such factors, that have rather curiously attracted little attention in the 
literature but which are, we argue, of particular importance not only 
during the period of fiscal adjustment but also prospectively for the 
restoration of long-run growth and competitiveness in the post-crisis 
period: the extent of economic openness and the quality of the domestic 
institutions (quality of government). 
4.1. The impact of openness 
Economic openness can have a bearing on economic growth and fiscal 
sustainability in two ways. On the one hand, open economies are typically 
characterised by smaller fiscal multipliers, owing to the fact that with 
openness the benefits from government spending and fiscal expansion 
‘leak-out’ from the domestic economy to the rest of the world (the trading 
partners); while the costs of fiscal contraction are somewhat neutralized by 
external demand. On the other hand, open economies are more likely to 
benefit disproportionately from some key austerity policies, such as 
internal devaluation (reduction in unit labour costs through lowering 
wages) or fiscal devaluation (reduction in unit labour costs via a shift of 
taxation from payroll to consumption taxes). The larger the export base 
and/or import share of a country, the larger will be the absolute 
contribution of such austerity/devaluation policies to restoring current 
account imbalances and stimulating growth. In both cases 
(leakages/multiplier and devaluation/price-competitiveness), we would 
expect the relationship between austerity and growth (and debt 
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sustainability) to be less negative for countries with greater economic 
openness.7 
FIGURE 2 
The growth–austerity relationship for open and closed economies 
 
Panel A: High-openness group                           Panel B: Low-openness group 
Notes: Author’s calculations; data from Wolf (2012) and the OECD International Trade 
database. 
In Figure 2 we examine how this variable affects the relationship between 
austerity and growth in the Eurozone countries (corresponding to panel A 
of Fig.1), by splitting these countries into two groups of ‘high’ (above-
median) and ‘low’ (below-median) trade openness (share of imports-plus-
exports to GDP). The results are particularly informative. In the high-
openness group the relationship between austerity and growth turns out to 
be totally insignificant and clearly non-negative. As is clear from the 
graph, in this group of countries, presumably owing to their ability to 
capitalise on the export-enhancing effect of internal devaluation, austerity 
has not been devastatingly recessionary.8 In contrast, as is shown in panel 
                                                 
7 In the ‘fiscal leakages’ argument the main factor would be the share of imports to GDP. In 
turn, in the ‘internal devaluation’ argument the main factor would be the share of exports 
to GDP. Trade openness measures the combination of these two factors (imports plus 
exports as a share of GDP).   
8 When we extend the sample to the full body of euro-pegged countries, the relationship 
becomes significantly positive (austerity contributing positively to growth), owing mainly 
to the influence of Latvia and Lithuania, which are clearly exceptional in terms of their 
growth performance given the size of their fiscal consolidation effort. Both of these 
countries experienced a very steep recession in 2009, which was however exceptionally 
short-lived and they returned to fast rates of growth immediately after the implementation 
of austerity. 
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B, in the more closed economies the relationship between austerity and 
growth is clearly negative and very significant statistically. For this group 
of countries, one percentage point of fiscal consolidation is associated with 
a drop of GDP growth of 3.5 percentage points. This value is over twice as 
high as those reported by Wolf (2012) and Krugman (2012b) which, as 
discussed earlier, exerted a significant influence on the emergence of the 
‘austerity doesn’t work’ narrative. It seems that for these rather closed 
economies austerity has indeed been recessionary.  
4.2. Quality of government 
The role that the quality of institutions and government can have on 
growth in the long-run is of course well recognised in the economics 
literature (Rodrik, 2000; Acemoglou et al, 2004; Acemoglou and Robinson, 
2012). The political science literature offers further insights to this, 
highlighting in particular the role of the ‘quality of government’, relating 
to factors such as good governance institutions, strong state and 
administrative capacities, capabilities concerning policy design and 
implementation, transparency in decision-making and credibility of policy, 
conducive ‘reform technologies’, control of corruption, and so forth 
(Rothstein, 2003 and 2011).9  We argue here that these parameters do not 
only affect the long-run growth and overall wealth of a country (including 
its long-term debt sustainability) but can also impact on the way in which 
fiscal policy – and in particular the implementation of austerity policies – 
affects growth and debt sustainability in the short-run.  
Effective (high-quality) governments have the ability to design appropriate 
fiscal measures and implement them in a timely and consensual fashion, 
through coalition-building and the adoption of non-adversarial policy 
discourses that justify and legitimise the policy. In such environments, 
policy exerts a sense of confidence, both domestically and abroad, that 
raises its credibility thus easing possible concerns about policy reversals 
and (public or party-political) reform resistances. With attention paid to 
the structural parameters of the economy (e.g., tax base, energy 
dependence, export capacities, growth drivers, propensities to import, etc) 
and the distribution of burdens across social/income groups, effective 
governments can ensure that the adverse effects of austerity are minimised 
and the expected gains materialise as fully as possible. In contrast, 
governments that lack the administrative and implementation capacities to 
                                                 
9 The reference to ‘good institutions’ by Acemoglou et al (2004) is similar, with emphasis 
especially on the enforcement of property rights and the control of corruption and rent -
appropriation. 
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pursue such goals are inevitably led to less appropriate, less credible, more 
widely contested, and ultimately less effective fiscal measures. One aspect 
of this concerns, quite naturally, the content of policy – especially fiscal 
policy. For example, Eyraud and Weber (2013) and Mineshima et al (2014) 
show that the balance between revenue- and expenditure-based measures 
affects significantly the debt-reduction achieved by any given level of fiscal 
consolidation effort. In turn, de Mooij and Keen (2012) argue that fiscal 
consolidation programmes that pursue a strategy of ‘fiscal devaluation’, 
i.e., shifting the revenue-base from taxing production to taxing 
consumption, contribute not only to export growth but also overall to more 
effective debt-reduction. Our view of government and institutional quality 
here goes well beyond these aspects: it concerns the overall effectiveness 
by which fiscal austerity is designed, communicated and implemented and 
in this sense it subsumes within it issues of ‘optimal taxation’ and of the 
appropriate composition of expenditure cuts.  
The intuition for our line of argument is that the primary balance affects 
debt dynamics (the debt-to-GDP ratio) not only directly, by adding 
(deficits) or subtracting (surpluses) from the overall level of debt, but also 
through its impact on two key intermediating variables: the interest rate 
charged on government debt (bond-rate) and the growth rate attained in 
the economy. Primary surpluses (as the outcome of fiscal tightening) 
contribute to lowering both of these parameters10. As a result, the overall 
effect of fiscal consolidation on debt will depend on the balance between 
these two influences: the interest-saving and growth-dampening effects of 
fiscal consolidation. It is the relative size of these two parameters that 
determines whether austerity works or not. 
4.3. Quality of government and debt-sustainability 
As noted already, the literature treats these two parameters largely as 
exogenous. Our hypothesis here is that both of these parameters are a 
function of a country’s quality of government, as defined above. Let us 
start with the case of bond-rates. Governments that carry low policy 
credibility or are perceived to be less effective (and thus less likely to 
control their deficits in the future), will face a higher risk premium (and 
                                                 
10 The assumption that bond-rates will decline with fiscal consolidation is directly derived 
from a simple consideration of investor behaviour: declining deficits signal a reduction of 
default risk thus driving interest rates down. The assumption that growth rates also decline 
with fiscal consolidation (tightening) is also directly derived from the Keynesian multiplier: 
unless the ‘textbook’ conditions of instantaneously adjusting prices and full and costless 
information apply, an economy’s rate of growth will unavoidably depend on its 
government’s fiscal balance, i.e., whether it implements fiscal expansion or contraction.  
 84 
thus higher bond-rates) for any given fiscal position. The difference will be 
more pronounced in times of crisis, when markets are more sensitive to 
risk, whereas it will tend to become almost indistinguishable when global 
risks are near-zero (or when markets are oblivious to risk). At the extreme, 
with extremely high systemic risks, the risk associated to high quality 
governments may in fact go down, thus pushing overall bond rates for 
these countries below their pre-crisis levels. Given, however, that interest 
rate adjustments are more accentuated for governments with low policy 
credibility, once such countries succeed in their attempts for fiscal 
consolidation, they will experience larger interest-savings than those 
experienced by governments of higher quality. As is shown in Figure 3, 
both of these predictions are true: in the early phase of the crisis bond rates 
actually declined for Germany, Finland and other ‘northern’ countries; 
while in the second phase of the crisis, after the implementation of the 
austerity measures, the decline was significantly faster for the ‘bailout’ 
countries (Ireland, Portugal and Greece). 
FIGURE 3 
Long-term government bond rates for selected Eurozone countries 
 
 
Notes: Long-term bond rates as defined in the EMU criterion. Author’s processing of data 
provided from Eurostat (series irt_lt_mcby). The series covers data for central government 
bond yields on the secondary market, gross of tax, with a residual maturity of around 10 
years. For further details see 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/irt_lt_mcby_esms.htm. 
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Consider next the case of growth. Assuming that there is a relation 
between growth and the fiscal stance, at least in the short-run, it is 
straightforward to expect that government quality will also have a bearing 
on the growth-inducing capacity of fiscal policy. More effective 
governments will be, by definition, able to attain higher growth rates for 
any given level of fiscal expansion (a larger multiplier) and lower growth 
penalties for any given level of fiscal contraction (a smaller multiplier). As 
a result, ‘low quality’ governments will find it more difficult to fend off the 
recessionary effects of austerity and, by implication, to avoid a situation 
whereby the snowball effect dominates the fiscal effort. In contrast, for 
‘high quality’ governments the negative growth effect will not only be 
smaller but it will also tend to decline further as systemic risk rises, owing 
to the declining interest rates (as discussed above) which will act as a 
stimulant to growth. At some theoretical value of government quality, 
fiscal austerity will not only contribute to debt-reduction but it may also 
have an overall positive effect on growth! Although this is seemingly 
counter-intuitive at first, it is nevertheless consistent with our earlier 
empirical observations, in relation to Figure 1, concerning the cases of 
countries such as Estonia and Germany, where (limited-scale) fiscal 
consolidation was successfully combined with non-increasing interest rates 
and significantly positive rates of output growth. 
FIGURE 4 
The growth–austerity relationship for high- and low- quality of government 
         
Panel A: High QoG group                                           Panel B: Low QoG group 
Notes: Author’s calculations; data from Wolf (2012) and Teorell et al (2013). 
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Figure 4 demonstrates how this effect is directly linked to the ‘quality of 
government’. Drawing again on the Eurozone sample (panel A in Figure 
1), in Figure 4 we split our group of countries into two groups of high- and 
low- quality of government.11  As is evident from the graphs, quality of 
government has a significant influence on the austerity–growth 
relationship. For the ‘high’ group, the relationship is clearly non-negative 
and indeed marginally positive. Instead, for ‘low’ quality of government 
countries, the relationship is devastatingly negative, with an estimated 
elasticity of -3.6%. From the data it is clear that it is in these low quality-of-
government cases that austerity “hasn’t worked”. We discuss the 
implications of these findings in the concluding section. 
5. Conclusions 
Fiscal austerity in response to the Eurozone debt crisis has led to an 
unprecedented recession in parts of the Eurozone south, raising concerns – 
and a general consensus in public discourse – that “austerity doesn’t 
work”. This contradicts common notions in the academic literature, about 
the recessionary effects of over-indebtedness, but also a number of stylised 
facts emanating from the experience of a range of Eurozone countries 
which saw a successful curtailment of their debt levels with minimal, or 
even positive, effects on their rates of growth. Indeed, a closer inspection of 
the empirics of the austerity–growth relationship in Europe during the 
crisis (section 3) reveals a range of cases where fiscal consolidation was 
attained concurrently with positive growth rates (Germany, Estonia, Malta, 
Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, etc), as well as a great variability in the 
intensity of the austerity–recession relationship even in cases where this 
relationship has been negative – with Greece being by far the most 
devastating example. The existing literature on the topic, as reviewed in 
section 2, identifies a range of factors – albeit ones that fall mainly outside 
the direct control of day-to-day policy – that may account for this 
variability through their influence on the size of the fiscal multiplier: 
including the exchange rate regime, the size of the public debt and the 
overall market sentiment (crisis). Although a limited number of 
contributions have looked also at more qualitative factors on which policy 
may have more direct control (e.g., the composition of expenditure cuts 
and other fiscal measures), generally there is little attention in the literature 
– and very limited appreciation of this in public and policy debates – on 
                                                 
11 We use the quality of government indicators produced by the Quality of Government 
Institute of the University of Gothenburg (Teorell et al, 2013), taking as the cut-off point the 
mean sample value of a joint indicator measuring 'government effectiveness', 'regulatory 
quality' and 'control of corruption'. 
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the importance that policy effectiveness (quality of governance) and 
domestic structural-economic factors have for shaping the size of the fiscal 
multiplier and the market responses to systemic and idiosyncratic risk. 
Lack of attention to these country-specific factors acts in a way to fuel the 
general disagreement about the ills and merits of austerity and, ultimately, 
the unproductive debate about who is to blame for the deep recession that 
has plagued (parts of) the Eurozone south (the “wrong recipe” versus 
“impotent governments” debate).  
This paper sought to re-frame this discussion by revisiting the growth – 
austerity – debt-sustainability relationship under the prism of trade 
openness and overall policy effectiveness / quality of government. 
Factoring-in these parameters allows us to explain a number of the stylised 
facts observed during the crisis, including the devastating recession and 
sizeable snowball effect in Greece; the much more modest recession in 
countries like Spain, Portugal and Ireland; the ‘success stories’ in parts of 
the Eurozone north; and even the surprising experience of declining or 
even negative nominal interest rates in the most agile of the Eurozone 
economies. Both of these parameters are of course ‘slow-moving’, in the 
sense that they cannot be altered instantaneously or by administrative and 
political decisions alone. Moreover, our treatment of these parameters here 
does not allow policy-making to identify the concrete policy actions that 
would be necessary to produce less devastating fiscal consolidation 
programmes and less recessionary austerity. For example, our analysis 
does not allow us to make specific claims about the relative importance of 
the broader institutional context (institutional rigidities, e.g., in the labour 
market, and reform resistances, e.g., strike action by unions) versus factors 
that are more directly linked to policy design and implementation 
(composition, timing and sequencing of fiscal consolidation measures; 
extent of and balance between internal and fiscal devaluation; the role of 
signalling and policy credibility; etc). Nor does it provide any directions as 
to how to enhance trade openness and strengthen a country’s export base. 
Nevertheless, our analysis demonstrates rather clearly that such factors, 
broadly grouped into the categories of ‘economic structure’ and ‘quality of 
government’, do play a role. It thus hopefully makes a contribution to 
shifting the austerity debate beyond the – largely counter-productive – 
discussion of whether austerity works, towards the realisation that 
country-specific conditions and capabilities are key for the effectiveness of 
any austerity programme (and, for that matter, also for any fiscal policy, 
including fiscal expansion).  
The message that derives from our analysis is not an unequivocal ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ on the question as to whether austerity works. Rather, our message is 
that austerity works in particular cases, e.g., where policy (in terms of 
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design, implementation and credibility) is sufficiently effective, but that it 
can have devastating effects in other cases, where quality of government 
and the economic base are significantly weaker. In this respect, when 
concerning the countries in the Eurozone that seem to have been locked 
into an ‘austerity trap’, the lesson drawn from our analysis is not that this 
has been the outcome of a “wrong recipe”, but rather the outcome of a 
potentially good recipe being applied in environments that were not 
suited, or capable, to execute the recipe correctly. In countries of weak 
economic base, institutional capacities and policy effectiveness, austerity 
leads to worse economic outcomes and little gains in terms of debt-
sustainability.  
There is a fundamental paradox in this realisation. On a simple reading of 
the analysis presented here, it would seem that fiscal consolidation (and 
discipline) can only work in open economies and high quality-of-
government countries. A seemingly obvious – but ultimately erroneous – 
conclusion would then be that fiscal austerity should not be applied to less 
extrovert economies with weaker institutional capacities and lower quality 
of government. And that, moreover, such countries should be allowed to 
‘inflate their way’ out of any fiscal problems – presumably with the 
support, via fiscal transfers, of more extrovert and institutionally stronger 
countries. This would of course create an immense moral hazard problem: 
it would introduce strong adverse incentives for public administrations, 
incentivising them to become less effective so as to fend-off external 
pressures for fiscal consolidation and justify the prolongation of fiscal 
laxity. Rather than being an argument in favour of the latter, the policy 
lesson that emanates from our analysis is that, for such countries, the 
design of austerity and fiscal consolidation measures needs to pay more 
attention to improving government quality and modernising the economic 
structure at the same time with – or even prior to – the implementation of 
fiscal consolidation measures. 
Proponents of the bailout packages devised by the Eurozone to deal with 
the debt crisis in the ‘south’ may argue that this was indeed a 
consideration, as is reflected in the huge efforts devoted to the setting up of 
country-specific Task Force teams and the insistence on structural reforms 
(including for market liberalisation / economic restructuring and for the 
modernisation of the public administration). Critics may counter-propose 
that this effort was only subsidiary and that, instead, most of the effort – 
and pressure – has been in the direction of imposing a fast and front-
loaded programme of fiscal austerity which was in this sense bound to 
produce more economic plight than the one it sought to address. There 
may be of course truth in both of these views. Moving forward, the lesson 
deriving from this analysis is that fiscal consolidation can work (and, 
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indeed, in many cases has worked); but that this requires a ‘qualitative 
jump’, a shift of attention from the question of whether to implement 
austerity to the question of how to implement it. Calls for such a shift are 
increasingly gaining currency both in the academic literature (Alesina and 
Giavazzi, 2012; Corsetti, 2012b) and in the public policy discourse. It is 
hoped that the analysis of this paper has made a distinctive contribution to 
this.  
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